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A new and suessful attak strategy in neural ryptography is presented. The neural ryptosys-
tem, based on synhronization of neural networks by mutual learning, has been reently shown
to be seure under dierent attak strategies. The advaned attaker presented here, named the
Majority-Flipping Attaker, is the rst whose suess does not deay with the parameters of the
model. This new attaker's outstanding suess is due to its using a group of attakers whih ooper-
ate throughout the synhronization proess, unlike any other attak strategy known. An analytial
desription of this attak is also presented, and ts the results of simulations.
PACS numbers: 87.18.Sn, 89.70.+
The use of neural networks in the eld of ryptography has reently been suggested[1℄, and has sine been a soure of
interest for researhers from dierent elds[2℄. The neural ryptosystem is based on the ability of two neural networks
to synhronize. The two networks undergo an online learning proedure alled mutual learning, in whih they learn
from eah other simultaneously, i.e. every network ats both as a teaher and as a student. Every time step the
networks reeive a ommon input vetor, alulate their outputs and update their weight vetors aording to the
math between their mutual outputs [3℄. The input/output relations are exhanged through a publi hannel until
their weight vetors are idential and an be used as a seret key for enryption and deryption of seret messages.
Thus we have a publi key-exhange protool whih is not based on number theory nor involves long numbers and
irreversible funtions, and is essentially dierent from any other ryptographi method known before.
The question is whether this system is seure, and to what degree? Sine the data is transferred through a publi
hannel, any attaker who eavesdrops might manage to synhronize with the two parties, and reveal their key. Yet
the attaker is in a position of disadvantage: while the parties perform mutual learning and approah one another,
the attaker performs dynami learning and hases them, therefore they have an advantage over him. The system's
seurity depends on whether they manage to exploit this advantage so that the attaker will forever stay behind.
The synhronization is based on a ompetition between attrative and repulsive stohasti fores between the parties.
Attrative fores bring them loser to eah other, and Repulsive fores drive them apart and delay the synhronization.
Synhronization is possible only if the attrative fores are stronger than the repulsive fores, (A > R). On one hand
if the attrative fores are too strong, synhronization is relatively fast and easy, so that an attaker eavesdropping
on the line and trying to synhronize will manage to do so easily. On the other hand if the repulsive fores are too
strong, synhronization will be hard for the attaker, but also for the two parties. A seure system is one whih
manages to balane these fores so that the net fore between the parties is positive and stronger than for the attaker
((A−R)parties > (A−R)attacker > 0).
The following is the model we use: The networks are Tree Parity Mahines (TPM) with K hidden units σi =
±1, i = 1, ...,K feeding a binary output, τ =∏Ki=1 σi, as shown in Figure 1. We used K = 3. The networks onsist
of a disrete oupling vetor wi =Wi1, ...,WiN and disjointed sets of inputs xi = Xi1, ..., XiN ontaining N elements
eah. The input elements are random variables xij = ±1. Eah omponent of the weight vetor an take ertain
disrete values Wij = ±L,±(L− 1), ...,±1, 0, and is initiated randomly from a at distribution.
The loal eld in the ith hidden unit is dened as
hi = wi · xi, (1)
and the output in the ith hidden unit is the sign of the loal eld. The output of the tree parity mahine is therefore
given by
τ =
K∏
i=1
sign(hi) =
K∏
i=1
σi.
During the mutual learning proess, the two mahines A and B, exhange their output values τA/B . They update
their weights using the hebbian learning rule, only in ase their outputs agree, and only in hidden units whih agree
with the output
w
A
i (t+ 1) = w
A
i (t) + xiτ
Aθ(τAσAi )θ(τ
AτB) (2)
w
B
i (t+ 1) = w
B
i (t) + xiτ
Bθ(τBσBi )θ(τ
AτB).
2ı3ı 2ı 1
2 ... N 21 ... N 2
Ĳ
N...11
Figure 1: A tree parity mahine with K = 3
This leads them to a parallel state in whih WA = WB. The attaker, C, tries to learn the weight vetor of one of
the two mahines, say A, yet unlike the simple teaher-student senario[4, 5℄, the teaher's weights in this ase are
time-dependant, therefore the attaker must use some attak strategy in order to follow the teaher's steps.
The following are possible attak strategies, whih were suggested by Shamir et al.[2℄: The Geneti Attak, in whih
a large population of attakers is trained, and every new time step eah attaker is multiplied to over the 2K−1
possible internal representations of {σi} for the urrent output τ . As dynamis proeeds suessful attakers stay
while the unsuessful are removed. The Probabilisti Attak, in whih the attaker tries to follow the probability of
every weight element by alulating the distribution of the loal eld of every input and using the output, whih is
publily known. The Naive Attaker, in whih the attaker imitates one of the parties. The most suessful attaker
suggested so far is the Flipping Attak (Geometri attak), in whih the attaker imitates one of the parties, but in
steps in whih his output disagrees with the imitated party's output, he negates ("ips") the sign of one of his hidden
units. The unit most likely to be wrong is the one with the minimal absolute value of the loal eld, therefore that
is the unit whih is ipped.
While the synhronization time inreases with L2[6℄, the probability of nding a suessful ipping-attaker dereases
exponentially with L,
P ∝ e−yL
as seen in Figure 2. Therefore, for large L values the system is seure[6℄. This an be supported also by the fat that
lose to synhronization the probability for a repulsive step in the mutual learning between A and B sales like (ǫ)2,
while in the dynami learning between the naive attaker C and A it sales like ǫ, where we dene ǫ = Prob
(
σCi 6= σAi
)
[9℄.
The attakers mentioned above try to imitate the parties, eah using dierent heuristis. They use an ensemble
of independent attakers. These attakers all develop an overlap with the parties during the synhronization proess
and also an overlap between themselves, yet eah attaker evolves independently, and is not inuened by the state of
the other attakers.
It has been shown that among a group of Ising vetor students whih perform learning, and have an overlap R with
the teaher, the best student is the enter of mass vetor (whih was shown to be an Ising vetor as well) whih has
an overlap Rcm ∝
√
R , for R ∈ [0 : 1][10℄. Therefore letting the attakers ooperate throughout the proess may be
to their advantage.
The new Majority Flipping Attaker presents a general strategy whih an be applied to some of the heuristi
attakers mentioned, and improve their results, and it uses the attakers as a ooperating group rather than as
individuals, an approah whih hasn't been done before. The majority strategy is the following: we start with a
group of M random attakers. Instead of letting them work independently and hope for one to be suessful, we let
them ooperate - when updating the weights, instead of eah mahine being updated aording to its own result,
all are updated aording to the majority's result. This team-work approah improves the attaker's performane.
Naturally, we hose to apply it to the most suessful attaker, the Flipping Attaker, thus reating the Majority-
Flipping Attaker.
The main result of this paper is the improvement of the suess rate of the ipping attaker when using the majority
sheme: The regular ipping attaker, although relatively suessful, is weakened by inreasing L, and the probability
for a suessful attaker, P , drops exponentially with L[6℄. When using the majority sheme, this probability seems
to approah a onstant value ∼ 0.5 independent of L[7℄.
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Figure 2: The attaker's suess probability P as a funtion of L, for the ipping attak and the majority-ipping attak, with
N=1000, M=100, averaged over 1000 samples. To avoid utuations, we dene the attaker suessful if he found out 98% of
the weights
When applying the majority strategy to the ipping attak, we reate M ipping attakers. In the beginning of the
proess, during a ertain time, the regular ipping attak is performed; those among the M mahines that disagree
with party A, have one of their hidden units' sign negated, and then their weights' vetors updated aording to their
new internal representations.
After a ertain time, we start to perform the majority proedure: In every odd time step we perform the regular
ipping attak, and in every even time step we perform a majority-ipping proedure, whih onsists of the following
two steps:
1) All attakers who disagree with party A ip one of their hidden units, aording to the regular ipping attak
proedure.
2) Now all the M attakers have the same output, but dierent internal representations of {σi}. We hek whih
of the four possible internal representations appears the most. Then, instead of updating every attaker aording
to its own internal representation, all are updated aording to the same internal representation - the majority's
representation. It is as if we let the mahines "vote", and all must use the internal representation that was "eleted".
When the attakers perform the majority step, they all perform the same step, therefore an overlap is developed
between them. The larger the overlap between them - the less eetive they are, beause eetively there are less
attakers. In the limit when all the attakers are idential there is eetively only one attaker. There is no way to
avoid this similarity between them. We rather prevent it from developing too quikly, and we do so by performing the
majority step only on even time steps, and not from the beginning of the proess but after a waiting time of about
1/3 of the entire synhronization time.
The result of using this sheme is shown in Figure 2. When omparing the suess of the ipping attaker with
and without the majority strategy, we see that for the latter the suess probability drops exponentially with L, while
for the former it remains around 0.5 even when L is inreased. Similar results of the majority-ipping attak suess
where obtained in the ase of the haoti neural network model[8℄.
Why is the majority-ipping attak so suessful? Every update of the weights an either bring every attaker
loser to party A (an "attrative step") or further away (a "repulsive step"). A repulsive step between the attaker
and A ours when there is a dierene in their internal representations (in steps where A and B perform an update).
A good attak strategy is one that manages to redue the probability for a repulsive step, and the majority-ipping
attaker does this by using the majority vote. One an overlap is developed between an attaker and mahine A, the
probability for a orret (attrative) internal representation Pa is larger than the probability for a repulsive one. For
a group of M ≫ 1 unorrelated attakers, whih all have an overlap ρAC with A, the probability that their majority
is orret is 1. However, if the attakers are orrelated, whih is the ase here, Pa < 1, yet it is larger than Pa of
just one ipping attaker, as an be seen in Figure 3 (in our simulations we obtained similar results for all M>50).
The majority's advantage over a random hoie is the essene of this attak, as shown also in the Bayes optimal
lassiation algorithm vs. Gibbs learning algorithm, where hoosing the majority proves to be better then a random
hoie[10℄.
The semi-analytial desription of this proess onrms these results and gives us further insight to the majority
attaker's suess. In the semi-analytial desription we desribe the system using (2L+1)×(2L+1) order parameters,
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Figure 3: The probability of attaker C to have a orret internal representation as a funtion of the average overlap between
the attakers and one of the parties, for ipping and majority-ipping attaks, measured in simulations with N=1000, M=300,
averaged over 105 samples.
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Figure 4: The probability for one of the M attakers to be suessful as a funtion of L, obtained from the analytial alulations
and simulations with N=1000, M=100. Here we dene synhronization when the average mutual overlap of the 3 hidden units
reahes 0.99. Results were averaged over 1000 samples.
and we manage to simulate the system in the thermodynami limit. We represent the state of the TPMs using a
matrix F of size (2L+ 1)× (2L+ 1), as desribed in [9℄. The elements of F are fqr, where q, r = −L, ...− 1, 0, 1, ...L.
The element fqr represents the fration of omponents in a weight vetor in whih the A's omponents are equal to q
and the mathing omponents of B are equal to r. Hene, the overlap between the two units and the norm of party
A, for instane, are given by:
R =
L∑
q,r=−L
qrfqr QA =
L∑
q=−L
q2fqr (3)
and the overlap ρAB = RAB/
√
QAQB. There are three matries representing the mutual overlap between a pair of
hidden units among A, B and C (we omitted the hidden unit's index for the sake of simpliity). We do not reate M
attakers but rather one, who represents one of the M attakers in the simulations.
This is the proedure every time step:
1)We randomly hoose K loal elds for the K hidden units of mahine A, from a Gaussian distribution with the
mean 0 and the standard deviation
√
QA.
2)We then randomly hoose K loal elds for the K hidden units of mahine B, from a Gaussian distribution with
the mean RABhA/QA and the standard deviation
√
QB −R2AB/QA (taking into aount B's overlap with A).
3)If the outputs of A and B disagree, they are not updated and we ontinue to the next time step. If they agree,
we update the matries representing A and B, and then update the attaker as desribed in the next step.
54)We set the internal representation of the attaker. For K=3 there are 8 possible internal representations. We
alulate their probabilities P1, ...P8, aording to the attaker's overlap with A and B and the loal elds of A and
B. For example the internal representation +++ has the probability:
P (+ + +) =
3∏
m=1
P (hCm > 0|hAm, hBm, {R,Q})
For simpliity we assume that there is no signiant dierene between the attaker's overlap with A and its overlap
with B and therefore we use only one of them so that
P
(
hCi > 0
∣∣hAi , {R,Q}) = H
(
−RAChA√
Q2AQC −R2ACQA
)
where H(x) =
∫
∞
x
e−t
2/2dt/
√
2π.
Next we simulate the ipping, when the 8 possible states are redued to 4: either states 1-4 (states with
positive output) ip to 5-8 (states with negative output) or vie versa, depending on A's output. We alu-
late the probabilities of the states' ipping, for example the probability that state +++ ipped to state -++ is:
P (+ + +) · P (hC
1
< hC
2
, hC
1
< hC
3
)
where
P
(
hC
1
< hC
2
, hC
1
< hC
3
)
=
∫
∞
0
P
(
hC
1
|hA
1
, hB
1
,
)
dhC
1
·∫
∞
hC
1
P
(
hC
2
|hA
2
, hB
2
,
)
dhC
2
· ∫∞hC
1
P
(
hC
3
|hA
3
, hB
3
,
)
dhC
3
We now remain with probabilities for four possible internal representations. In the ase of a regular ipping step,
we randomly hoose one of these four states aording to their probabilities, but in the ase of a majority step, the
probability of hoosing the orret internal presentation is higher. We do not alulate it, but rather measure it in
the simulations, and use the measured probability (presented by dashed line in Figure 3) in the analytial proedure.
Figure 4 shows the suess probability of one of the M attakers, as funtion of L. It shows a fairly good agreement
between the analytial and the simulation results (see [11℄).
To onlude, an important step in the eld of neural ryptography has been made, presenting a new attaking
approah, under whih the TPM ryptosystem is inseure. The question is, an we reate a more sophistiated system
that will be seure under the majority attak? A seure system will be one for whih the probability for a orret step
of the majority ipping attaker will be near the ipping attaker's urve in Figure 3, yet the synhronization time
of the parties will still remain polynomial with L. There an be many ideas for suh kind of a system, for example a
system in whih K > 3, so that repulsive fores are stronger. Yet keeping the synhronization time polynomial with
L is not easy when repulsive fores are too strong, so these models are still under onsideration, and the hallenge is
still standing.
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